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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Richard Hubbard appeals, asserting that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, or alternatively, by not ruling on his
motion for the district

judge to recuse herself. Specifically, he claimed that the

district court violated his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy when it
imposed his sentence for failing to register as a sex offender because it based his
sentence on the facts of the underlying lewd and lascivious charge that had been
resolved in California, rather than basing the sentence on the facts of the charge filed in
Idaho.
In summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition for post-conviction relief, the
district court relied on its own recollection of the considerations behind its statements at
the sentencing hearing. This was error because those facts were not necessary to
resolve the double jeopardy issue.

Alternatively, it was erroneous for the presiding

district court judge to essentially testify to those facts.

Relying on those facts also

highlights the conflict of the judge's interests at issue in this case. Therefore, this Court
should reverse the order summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition, or, alternatively,
it should vacate the order summarily dismissing the petition and remand the case for
new proceedings before a different judge.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Hubbard entered a guilty plea to the charge of failure to register.

State v. Hubbard, 2013 WL 5982874, 1 (Ct. App. 2013), review denied (unpublished
opinion from the direct appeal of the judgment of conviction).

1

He appealed from the

judgment of conviction, asserting that the district court had violated his constitutional
right to

free from double jeopardy when it imposed his

Id. The

rt of

Appeals determined that the issue had not been preserved below and was not
reviewable as fundamental error.

Id.

However, it noted that Mr. Hubbard could still

raise the issue before the district court following remand of the case. Id.
Thereafter, Mr. Hubbard filed a timely petition for post conviction relief,
contending, inter a/ia, that the district court had violated his constitutional right to be free
from double jeopardy when it imposed his sentence.

(See, e.g., R., pp.5, 7.)

Specifically, he claimed that the district court had subjected him to multiple punishments
for the same conduct, evidenced by its assertions that:
it felt California had been too lenient when it sentenced Mr. Hubbard [and]
did not trust California to keep Mr. Hubbard in prison (which the Idaho
district court believed was necessary, but which the California superior
court, in its discretion, had suspended), and so the Idaho district court
decided to go above and beyond the recommendation of the State and
impose a significant prison sentence in the California superior court's
stead.
(R., p.13; see also R., pp.43-46 (counsel bolstering that claim, quoting extensively from
the transcript of the sentencing hearing).) Mr. Hubbard also requested that the district
court judge recuse herself from this case because those comments indicated bias or
prejudice against him. (R., pp.6-7.) The district court judge did not rule on the motion
for disqualification, but she did continue to preside over the case. ( See generally R.)
Mr. Hubbard's attorney also moved the district court to consolidate the post
conviction proceedings with the criminal case, so that the district court could provide
relief pursuant to I.C.R. 35(a) in the criminal case based on the same double jeopardy
violation.

(See R., p.41.)

Defense counsel asserted that part of the reason for the

2

motion was to ensure that the underlying criminal record was before the district court in
the
to

conviction proceedings.' (Post Conviction Tr., p.6, Ls.6-7.) The

objected

motion to consolidate, and also asserted that Mr. Hubbard's claim on double

jeopardy was fully litigated during the direct appeal, and so, should be barred by res
judicata. (R., pp.77-79, 81.) Both parties requested summary disposition in their favor.
(R., pp.48-49, 96.)
At a hearing on the motions for summary judgment, the district court decided that
res judicata did not bar Mr. Hubbard's double jeopardy claim because the issue was not
addressed on its merits in the direct appeal.

(Post Conviction Tr., p.14, L.23 - p.15,

) The district court also pointed out that Mr. Hubbard had the option to pursue his
double jeopardy claim in either through an I.C.R. 35 motion or through

conviction

pursuant to I.C. § 19-4901, and that he had opted to use the post conviction petition.
(Post Conviction Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.2; Post Conviction Tr., p.13, Ls.1-17.) As a
result, it denied the motion to consolidate.

(Post Conviction Tr., p.15, Ls.3-5.) The

Mr. Hubbard also moved the district court to "take judicial notice of its own record in
[CR} FE 2011 9346 . . . including, without limitation, the information, judgment,
presentence report, sealed order correcting the presentence report, and the transcript of
the entry of plea (August 24, 2011) and sentencing (October 12, 2011 )." (R., pp.10102.) The district court took judicial notice of "the Court's guilty plea form, the guilty plea
and sentencing transcript, and the portions of the presentence investigation report ...
identified by [Mr.] Hubbard." (R., pp.116-17.) A motion for this Court to take judicial
notice of these same documents has been filed contemporaneously with this brief.
As it appears as though the entire PSI was included in the order taking judicial
notice, citations to the presentence investigation report (hereinafter, PSI) will
correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file "HUBBARD PSI," which
was provided in Docket Number 39449. Additionally, citations to the transcripts which
were judicially noticed from the underlying criminal case file (which are contained in a
single volume) will be identified as "Criminal Tr." Citations to the transcript of the
summary dismissal hearing prepared in this case will be identified as "Post Conviction
Tr." Since the district court apparently did not take judicial notice of the record
underlying criminal case, only the Post Conviction record is cited in this brief.
1
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district cou1i also decided that it did not need any more evidence to resolve
Conviction Tr., p.1

double

Ls.2-5.)

The district court decided to grant the State's motion for summary dismissal.
(R., p.'117.) In reaching that conclusion, the district court offered its recollection of its
intent and considerations behind its statements at the sentencing hearing which
Mr. Hubbard was challenging as violating his constitutional rights:
In Hubbard's case, the Court properly considered the California case and
Hubbard's entire criminal history, in order to determine whether Hubbard
was a danger to society. Counsel for Hubbard argued that California
should take responsibility for Hubbard, as it would save the Idaho
taxpayer's money and the underlying charge occurred in California. The
Court addressed this argument by observing California had continually
Hubbard had continually violated first his probation
released Hubbard
and then his
Based on that history, the Court did not
California would properly protect society and the public from Hubbard.
(R., p.123.) As a result of that assertion, the district court concluded that Mr. Hubbard's
claim for post conviction relief on the basis of double jeopardy could be summarily
dismissed. (R., p.124.)
Mr. Hubbard filed a timely notice of appeal from the final judgment dismissing his
petition for post conviction relief. (R., pp.131-35.)

4

ISSUES

1.

Whether the district court
for post conviction relief
at the sentencing hearing.

by summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition
on its inappropriate explanation of its statements

Whether the district court erred by not ruling on Mr. Hubbard's motion for the
district court judge to recuse herself from this case.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Summarily DismissingMr. Hubbard's Petition For Post
Conviction Relief Based On Its Inappropriate Explanation Of Its Statements At The
Sentencing Hearing

A.

As The Question Of Whether The Record Demonstrates A Double Jeopardy
Violation Is A Question Of Law, Additional Fact Finding Was Not Necessary
In this case, Mr. Hubbard presented facts which he alleged demonstrated a

violation of his constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy.

The question of

whether there has been a double jeopardy violation is a question of law. State v. Bush,
131 Idaho 22, 33 (1997); State v. Moffat, 154 Idaho 529, 530-3·1 (Ct. App. 2013), review

denied. Thus, when a challenge has been made that the record demonstrates a double

jeopardy violation, no additional fact finding is necessary; rather, the court considering
that claim need simply review the record to determine whether there has, as a matter of
law, been a violation. See id. The district court recognized as much. (Post Conviction
Tr., p.16, Ls.2-5 (deciding that it did not need additional evidence to resolve the double
jeopardy question).) Therefore, it was unnecessary and irrelevant for the district court
to rely on additional facts from its memory of its intent and considerations at the
sentencing hearing.
Additionally, questions of law are reviewed de nova. See, e.g., Karle v. Visser,
141 Idaho 804, 806 (2005). Therefore, this case does not need to be remanded since
this Court can review the evidence properly in the record and determine whether there
was a double jeopardy violation.

The evidence properly in the record in this case

demonstrates that there was a violation of Mr. Hubbard's constitutional rights.

6

Therefore, this Court should reverse

of summary judgment and order relief for

Hubbard.
To be entitled to relief in post conviction, a petitioner must prove his claims by a
preponderance of the evidence. Grube v. State, 134 Idaho

27 (2000). Mr. Hubbard

has met that burden in regard to his double jeopardy claim.

The United States

Constitution provides: "No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The federal protection against
double jeopardy has been incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U . 711, 717 (1969), overruled on other
grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U

.

802-03 (1989). The Idaho Constitution

provides the same protection as the federal constitution.

IDAHO

CONST. Art. I, § 13.

Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution is coextensive with its federal counterpart.
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 624 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
These protections can be violated in three ways:

(1) engaging in a second

prosecution for the same offense after an acquittal has been entered; (2) engaging in a
second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction has been entered; and
(3) imposing multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. DiFrancesco,
449 U.S. 117, 129 (1980); McKeeth, 136 Idaho at 622. The district court's violation in
this case is an example of the third form of violation. The Idaho Supreme Court has
recognized that, even if the punishments imposed are authorized by the Legislature,

7

imposing additional punishments in a second proceeding violates the dou
protections. State v. Avelar, 1

jeopardy

778 ('1999). 2

Idaho

Mr. Hubbard had been sentenced for the underlying charges by the appropriate
court in California, where all the relevant acts took place. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.131-32
(the Judgment of Conviction entered by the California superior court).) The California
superior court imposed a six-year sentence, which it suspended for a five-year period of
probation. (PSI, pp.131-137.) It also ordered Mr. Hubbard to serve 364 days in custody
before being released on probation. (PSI, p.131.) When Mr. Hubbard was found to be
in violation of his probation in 2005, the California court revoked Mr. Hubbard's
probation and executed the underlying six-year sentence. (PSI, p.156.) Mr. Hubbard
was subsequently released on parole. (See, e.g., PSI, p.143.)
Nevertheless, the Idaho district court, displeased with the California superior
court's sentencing decisions, determined that "I don't feel comfortable trusting California

The Idaho Supreme Court cited to United States v. Halper to support this conclusion.
490 U.S. 435 (1989). Halper held that the State may not seek a civil penalty that is for
retributive, as opposed to remedial, purposes in a proceeding separate from the
proceeding in which the criminal penalty was imposed because doing so constitutes a
second punishment and so violates the protections against double jeopardy. Halper,
490 U.S. at 448-49. Halper, however, has been subsequently abrogated because it
deviated from traditional double jeopardy analyses. Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93, 99, 101 (1997). It failed to make the threshold determination of whether the
civil penalties were so punitive as to transform them into criminal penalties, thus
bringing them within the realm of the double jeopardy protections, and it also failed to
assess the statute under which the sanctions were imposed, as opposed to the
character of the sanctions themselves. Id. The Hudson abrogation, however, only
attacks the Halper Court's consideration of the penalties themselves, not the conclusion
that imposing them at a second proceeding would violate the double jeopardy
protections. See id. As such, the Idaho Supreme Court's conclusion in Avelar survives
Hudson, so long as the additional penalties are appropriately within the scope of the
double jeopardy protections. Imposing more extensive prison sentences are definitely
within the scope of those protections.
2
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to not allow you out

"

(Criminal Tr.,

Ls.4-6.)

Idaho

court

I'm not going to go through all of the--everything that's in this presentence
report. But it is really clear that the prosecutor has nailed it.[3] You blame
the victim in this case, and according to her statements, that abuse started
when she was six years old. And there was a second person who came
and made allegations, whether he was convicted or not. And I've also
found that people can pass polygraphs all over the place.[4]
(Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.15-24 (emphasis added to provide one of many examples of the
district court's focus on the facts of the underlying California crime, rather than the
charge pending before it).) The Idaho district court's statements reveal that it felt that its
cou

from California had somehow abused its discretion (although there has

been no showing that it had done so) and been too lenient in its dealings with
Mr. Hubbard. (See, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.32, L.6.) As a result, the district
court imposed the sentence it did to punish Mr. Hubbard for those underlying offenses:
"I recognize what I'm going to do is going to cost the taxpayers here, but I suspect that
the taxpayer would just as soon pay the cost to make sure that you're locked up and not

The prosecutor comments in this regard focused on a letter Mr. Hubbard wrote to the
mother of the victim in the California case in which he discussed his views of the
California offense at that time. (See Tr., No. 39449, p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.13.) The letter
is included in the PSI immediately following the police reports and immediately
preceding the judgment of conviction in the underlying California case, indicating that it
was written at the time the underlying case was proceeding in California some ten years
ago. (See PSI, pp.124-32.)
4 This statement indicates that the Idaho district court felt that Mr. Hubbard had
hoodwinked its counterpart from California, earning a more lenient sentence because
he had been deliberately deceptive on a polygraph. (See Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.22-25.)
Mr. Hubbard had taken and passed that polygraph in regard to accusations from a
second potential victim (i.e., answered truthfully, denying those allegations). (See
Criminal Tr., p.31, Ls.13-22.) According to Mr. Hubbard, there was not a second
conviction at that time, but rather, there was just a revocation of his probation. (Criminal
Tr., p.31, Ls.9-22.)
3
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do what it's supposed to do." (Criminal Tr., p.30,

trust

Furthermore, the district court berated Mr. Hubbard, saying:
I sort of heard a theme there that, you know, it's the meth, it's the
marijuana ... no one in my drug court while under the influence of any of
those drugs goes out and molests young girls. Your drugs have nothing to
do with it. That was a decision you made .... You blame the victim in this
case.
(Criminal Tr., p.29, L.22 - p.30, L.3; p.33, Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).)
interestingly, the district court refers to "the victim in this case."

Most

(Criminal Tr., p.33,

Ls.18-19.) "This case" is a failure to register case. (See R., p.67.) The only victim in a
failure to

case is the state; there is no specific victim.

( See,

PSI, p.2.)

There is certainly not a victim who Mr. Hubbard can blame. In fact, he did not blame
Idaho for his failure to register: "I was absconding, so I wasn't even looking up the laws
or anything. I was trying to get (a friend] up here to the VA hospital and get gone, get
back to California. So I didn't even bother looking it up. [I] was being a big dummy."
(Criminal Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.) He accepted responsibility for his actions and did
not blame the State of Idaho for his failure. (See Criminal Tr., p.16, L.25 - p.17, L.5.)
As such, the only victim to whom the Idaho district court could possibly be
referring is the victim in the underlying California case. The fact that it refers to her as
the victim "in this case" is critical and clearly demonstrates the error. (Criminal Tr., p.33,
Ls.18-19 (emphasis added).) "This case" is not the California case, yet the district court
behaved as if it were. Therefore, the sentence it imposed was premised on the facts of
the California case, not the failure to register charge, and thus, clearly violated
Mr. Hubbard's state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy.
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It is also evident that the facts

by the district court were not relevant

failure to register.

to

, p.67 (noting

Mr. Hubbard was only

charged in Idaho of failing to register).) The applicable statutes only require the State to
prove that Mr. Hubbard was subject to the relevant code sections and that he failed to
provide certain information to the State within the requisite time frame. See I.C. § 188307.

It does not require an investigation or disclosure of the underlying offense.

See id. The inquiry is separate and distinct from the underlying prosecution. 5 See id.;
I.C. § 18-8311. The punishment for failing to register is also separate from the sentence
for the underlying offense.

See I.C. § 18-8311 (particularly noting the fact that if the

defendant was on probation (i.e., already separately punished) 6 when he failed to
register, the district court's discretion to order probation or retain jurisdiction is
removed).
And while consideration of the defendant's criminal record may be permissible at
sentencing, the district court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for the judgment
of another court.

See, e.g., State v. Harrington, 133 Idaho 563, 567 (Ct. App. 1999)

(recognizing that the sentencing court has broad discretion, which will not be interfered
with absent a showing of clear abuse of that discretion). It is impermissible to remedy
any dissatisfaction with the severity of a sentence imposed by another court by

5

This is particularly true in this case, since the Idaho district court would have no
jurisdiction over the acts committed in Trinity County, California.
6 Mr. Hubbard recognizes that the statute does not clarify whether the probation is for
the underlying offense or some other offense, but would assert that, as this section is
predicated on a prior offense, the period of probation may be reasonably construed to
include probation for the underlying offense. See I.C. § 18-8311. As such, the statute
itself does recognize that this is a separate and distinct punishment from that for the
underlying crime. See id.

11

punishing the defendant again for

same offenses.

v. Findeisen, 1

230 (Ct App. 1999). Nevertheless, based on its comments, that is
the district court did to Mr. Hubbard.

Idaho
what

(See, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.30, L.21 - p.31, L.1;

p.32, Ls.2-6.)
By sentencing Mr. Hubbard based on the conduct in the underlying California
case, rather than for the Idaho failure to register, the district court violated
Mr. Hubbard's constitutional right to be free from double jeopardy. Therefore, this Court
should reverse the order summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition and order
appropriate relief in his favor.

B.

If Additional Facts And Explanations Are Necessary To The Summary Judgment
Decision, Mr. Hubbard Was Entitled To An Evidentiary Hearing, And The
Presiding Judge Could Not Be The Source Of That Additional Evidence At The
Subsequent Hearing
Summary dismissal of a petition for post conviction relief is only appropriate

when the petitioner does not allege facts establishing a genuine issue of material fact,
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to relief. Baldwin v. State,
145 Idaho 148, 153 (2007). To that end, "[a] court is required to accept the petitioner's
unrebutted allegations as true, but need not accept the petitioner's conclusions." Id.
Additionally, "summary judgment is improper when a conflict in affidavits respecting
issues of fact exists, or when the relevant pleadings, depositions and affidavits raise any
questions of credibility of witnesses." Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 798
(2001) (quoting Straley v. Idaho Nuclear Corp., 94 Idaho 917, 918-19 (1972)); see also

Land O'Lakes, Inc. v. Bray, 138 Idaho 817, 818-18 (Ct. App. 2003).

12

In summarily dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition, the district court judge offered
following explanation of the intent and considerations underlying

sentencing

decisions:
In Hubbard's case, the Court properly considered the California case and
Hubbard's entire criminal history, in order to determine whether Hubbard
was a danger for society. Counsel for Hubbard argued that California
should take responsibility for Hubbard, as it would save the Idaho
taxpayer's money and the underlying charge occurred in California. The
Court addressed this argument by observing California had continually
released Hubbard and Hubbard had continually violated first his probation
and then his parole. Based on that history, the Court did not believe
California would properly protect society and the public from Hubbard.
(R., p.123.) Even if the district court's assertion about its thoughts and considerations at
the sentencing hearing might properly be considered in the post conviction context, that
explanation only creates a genuine issue of material fact in regard to whether the district
court was sentencing Mr. Hubbard based on the California case. See Wait, 136 Idaho
at 798. As such, even if the district court's assertion is considered, the order summarily
dismissing Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief should still be vacated and
the case remanded for an evidentiary hearing.
Furthermore, the district court's assertion does not actually contradict most of
Mr. Hubbard's allegations. For example, the assertion does not offer any clarification as
to how, by imposing a sentence because "you [Mr. Hubbard] blame the victim in this
case," (see, e.g., Criminal Tr., p.33, Ls.18-19), the district court was imposing a
sentence for anything but the underlying California case. As a result, even if the district
court's assertion was properly considered, it still erred by summarily dismissing
Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief, since Mr. Hubbard's unrebutted
allegations, if true, would entitle him to relief.

13

the district court's assertion about its thoughts and considerations is
not properly considered as evidence against Mr. Hubbard's allegations because that
assertion does not constitute competent evidence upon which the district court could
properly rely. Cf. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 82 (2002) (holding that a district
court's conclusion will be deemed clearly erroneous if it was not supported by
substantial and competent evidence). That is because "[t]he judge presiding at the trial
may not testify as a witness. No objection need be made in order to preserve the point."
1.R.E. 605.

The district court judge's explanation of her statements is the functional

equivalent of testimony designed to establish facts not otherwise in the record based on
the district court judge's own memory of the event in question

namely the district

court's intention and mindset when it imposed the sentence in this case.
The conclusion that the presiding judge is not a competent witness in the
pending case is consistent with the rule that the district court judge may not take judicial
notice of her own memory. "Facts may not be judicially noticed simply because they are
within the personal recollected knowledge of the judge, if those facts are not also
generally known in the jurisdiction." Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-08 (1992).
This is because such facts "are not capable of accurate and ready determination." Id. at
808; see also I.RE. 201 (to be properly subject to judicial notice, the facts must be
"capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned").

Therefore, as the Idaho Supreme Court has

already held, summary dismissal of a post conviction petition based only on facts
remembered by the district court judge constitutes error.
807-08.

14

Matthews, 122 Idaho at

in
Mr. Hu

district court
post conviction petition only on

its decision to summarily dism
the court

remembered about

its intent and considerations at the sentencing hearing. (See R., pp.123-24.) Those
facts were not generally known in the jurisdiction of the district court in this case. No
other person could have known what was in the judge's mind as she imposed
Mr. Hubbard's sentence, and she could not testify as to those facts while presiding over
the case.

Furthermore, those facts were not capable of an accurate and ready

authentication, "since judges, like witnesses in criminal trials, lack infallible memories
and perfect records of their motivations." Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 57 (1973).
Therefore, those facts were beyond the jurisdiction of the district court to consider in
resolving the post conviction claim

a double jeopardy violation.

The district court erred by relying on its own account of what it was considering
and why. As a result, if such additional evidence needs to be considered to resolve the
double jeopardy question, this Court should vacate order summarily dismissing
Mr. Hubbard's petition for post conviction relief and remand the case for an evidentiary
hearing.

11.
The District Court Erred By Not Ruling On Mr. Hubbard's Motion For The District Court
Judge To Recuse Herself From This Case
In his initial filing, Mr. Hubbard requested that the district court judge recuse
herself in this case. (R., p.7.) He made that request based on the district court judge's
"clearly apparent [bias) and evidenced prejudicial comments and beliefs made on the
record in the district court (See [Criminal] Tr., p.29, L.16 - p.33, L.55 [sic).)" (R., p.6.)
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Because he made the motion based on the district court judge's bias or prejud

it

I.R.C.P. 40(d)(2)(A)(4 ).

The

constituted a motion for disqualification for cause.

Rules of Civil Procedure require that the district court rule on such motions: "Upon filing
of a motion for disqualification, the presiding judge shall be without authority to act
further in such action except to grant or deny such motion for disqualification."
I.R.C.P. 40(d)(5). The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted that rule to mean that "all
orders following the filing of a motion to disqualify ... but prior to a ruling on that motion,
'were improper, void and of no effect."' Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho 469, 470 (1995)
(quoting Lewiston Lime Co. v. Barney, 87 Idaho 462,467 (1964)).
The district court did not rule on Mr. Hubbard's motion for disqualification for
cause. (See generally R.) As such, all the orders in the post conviction proceedings,
including the order summarily dismissing the petition, are improper, void and of no
effect.

Therefore, this Court should vacate those orders and remand this case for

further proceedings complying with the Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the event that this Court determines that the district court judge did implicitly
deny that motion by continuing to preside over the case, the district court abused its
discretion in doing so.

Denial of a motion for a judge to recuse herself is reviewed

under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 390 (2013),
reh 'g denied.

The code of judicial conduct provides:
A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not
limited to instances where:
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(a) the judge . . .
personal
of disputed evidentiary
facts that might reasonably affect the judge's impartiality in the
proceedings; [or]
(d) the judge ...
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness
in the proceeding.
Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E(1 )(a), (d)(iv). In this case, it was obvious
from Mr. Hubbard's initial pleadings that the district court judge's personal knowledge of
disputed facts was going to be at issue in this case, as only she could offer any
potentially-relevant insight as to the rationales behind the challenged sentencing
determinations.

Additionally, because this particular judge's decision was being

challenged on the basis that it violated one of the defendant's constitutional rights, the
judge was being asked to review the propriety of her own conduct.

That conflict of

interest creates, at least, the appearance of impropriety in the subsequent post
conviction decisions. Therefore, the district court judge abused her discretion by not
recusing herself in this matter.
As a result, this case should, at least, be remanded for new proceedings before a
different judge. This should be the result regardless of whether this Court determines
that the district court erred by not ruling on the motion for disqualification or by
improperly denying the motion for disqualification.
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CONCLUSION

that this

Mr. Hubbard respectfully

rt reverse the order summarily

dismissing his petition for post conviction relief and order relief be granted.
Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order summarily dismissing his
petition and remand this case for new proceedings before a new district court judge.
DATED this 31 st day of July, 2014.

gR.IAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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